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INTRODUCTION
That the use of technology has radically changed the legal
profession is beyond dispute.1 Through technology, lawyers can
now represent clients in faraway states and countries, and they
can represent even local clients through a “virtual law office.”2
Gone are the times in which the lawyer’s choices for
communicating with clients primarily involve preparing formal
business letters to convey advice, holding in-person client
meetings in the office, or conducting telephone calls with clients
on landlines from the confines of the lawyer’s office. Not only do
lawyers have choices about how to communicate with their clients,
but they also frequently choose electronic modes of
communication.3
1 ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW 3-4 (2012)
[hereinafter INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW], available at http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdutio
n_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
2 For a definition of a “virtual law office,” see Jordana Hausman, Who’s Afraid of
the Virtual Lawyers? The Role of Legal Ethics in the Growth and Regulation of Virtual
Law Offices, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 575, 577-78 (2012). According to Hausman, a
virtual law office differs from a traditional law firm with an Internet presence in that
the virtual law office utilizes an on-line portal maintained by a third party and
accessed via the Internet to communicate with the client and store the client’s
confidential information. Id.; see also Letter from ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20
Working Grp. on the Implications of New Techs., to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass’ns
(state, local, specialty and int’l), Law Schs., Individuals, and Entities (Sept. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter Client Confidentiality Issues Paper], available at http:// www.americanbar
.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/work_product
.html. The on-line portal is often referred to as “cloud computing,” and often uses
technology known as “software as a service.” Id.
3 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 4. The ABA report described the
prevalence of technology as follows:
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Though using technology for client communications is
typically faster and often more convenient than traditional modes
of communication, a lawyer’s ethical obligations impact whether
or how to use technology.4 The use of technology impacts three of
the lawyer’s most fundamental obligations–the lawyer’s duties to
communicate with the client, to protect the confidentiality of that
communication, and to provide competent representation.5 For
those reasons, whether a lawyer’s use of technology comports with
the lawyer’s ethical requirements has been the source of
numerous ethics committee opinions over the last twenty years,6
as well as a series of amendments to the American Bar
Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model
Rules”).7 Though it is now universally accepted that lawyers can
use technology for client communications, the prevalence of
technology does not dictate that its use is always appropriate.

In the past, lawyers communicated with clients by telephone, in person, by
facsimile or by letter. Lawyers typically stored client confidences in paper
form, often inside locked file cabinets, behind locked office doors or in offsite
storage facilities. Even when confidential client information was maintained
electronically, the information was stored on desktop computers that
remained within the firm or on servers typically located in the same office.
Today, lawyers regularly communicate with clients electronically, and
confidential information is stored on mobile devices, such as laptops, tablets,
smartphones, and flash drives, as well as on law firm and third-party servers
(i.e., in the “cloud”) that are accessible from anywhere.
Id.
4 A lawyer’s use of email for client communications potentially impacts both the
lawyer’s compliance with ethical requirements and ability to assert that the attorneyclient privilege protects the communication. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6 cmt. 5 (2013). This Article focuses solely on the implications for the lawyer’s
compliance with ethical requirements.
5 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.4, 1.6 (2013).
6 See infra notes 10-12, 14-35, 37-40, 48-78, 84-93, 97-109, 111-19, 130-32 and
accompanying text. The ethics committee opinions have analyzed issues such as
whether a lawyer can use email to communicate with a client, whether a lawyer can
use third-party service providers to store client confidential information, and whether a
lawyer who receives misdirected or unintended confidential information from opposing
counsel can review the information. Part II discusses ethics committee opinions
analyzing the use of mobile telephones and email. Issues relating to the use of thirdparty service providers to store confidential client information and the lawyer’s
obligations upon receipt of confidential client information from opposing counsel are
beyond the scope of this Article.
7 See infra notes 135-65,167-72 and accompanying text.
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Because the majority of today’s law students and new
lawyers are predisposed to use technology,8 law professors and
supervising lawyers should raise these ethical issues with their
students and the new lawyers under their supervision,
respectively. This instruction is crucial because law students’ and
new lawyers’ comfort with technology perhaps makes it more
difficult for them to anticipate risks associated with it, which
ethics opinions and the Model Rules require.
Part I of this Article analyzes state and ABA ethics opinions
that consider the propriety of a lawyer’s use of technology for
client communications. Part II discusses changes to the Model
Rules since 2000 relating to the use of technology by lawyers and
its impact on the practice of law. Part III proposes that law
professors and lawyers charged with instructing or mentoring law
students and new lawyers regarding client communications
educate them regarding not only the content of those
communications, but also how and when to use technology.
Perhaps ironically, the additional instruction regarding how and
when to use technology is a necessity because of the frequency and
ease with which the current generation of law students uses
technology.

I. ETHICS OPINIONS ANALYZING THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY FOR
CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
Armed with a set of ethical rules drafted during a period well
before the rise of smart phones, tablets, and laptop computers,
ethics committees in the 1990s began tackling the issue of
whether and how lawyers could use technology to communicate
with their clients. First, the ethics committees considered whether
lawyers could use mobile telephones for conversations with their
clients. In the mid-1990s, the focus shifted from mobile telephones
to email as its use became more prevalent with practitioners.

8 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MILLENTIALS: A PORTRAIT OF GENERATION NEXT 25
(2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confidentconnected-open-to-change.pdf (“Millennials [the generation that includes current law
students and new lawyers] outpace older Americans in virtually all types of Internet
and cell use.”).
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A. Mobile Telephones
Mobile telephones were the first technology to be subject to
scrutiny by ethics committees. Specifically, the ethics committees
considered the highly debated topic of whether a lawyer could
even use either a cordless or a cellular telephone to talk with a
client.9 Questions emerged regarding the use of mobile telephones
for conversations with clients because of the concern that a third
party could overhear or intercept the conversation.
Conversations using mobile telephones were believed
susceptible to interception because of the technology used in
transmitting signals: radio waves.10 The use of radio waves
increased the risk of interception of mobile telephone
conversations because even unsophisticated devices like baby
monitors use radio waves.11 Specifically, a third party could
potentially overhear or intercept a conversation in one of several
different ways: intentionally eavesdropping by use of a scanner,
“pirating” by an employee of a cellular provider, or unintentionally
hearing the conversation because of a cross in radio bands.12

9 See generally David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much about Transmitting Client
Confidences by Internet E-mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 481-85 (1997)
(describing confidentiality concerns relating to use of cordless and cellular telephones);
Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, Competence and Confidentiality in the Context of
Cellular Telephone, Cordless Telephone, and E-mail Communications, 33 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 467, 475-78 (1997) (same).
10 Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf; Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct, Op. 90-44 (1991), available at http://www.iabar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f
6686256497004ce492/4764a33e255e9f02862564b2000f5939?OpenDocument; N.H. Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992), available at http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/FO9
1-92-6.pdf; N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. RPC 215 (1995), available at
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page=26&from=1/1995&to=12/1995.
For
a
discussion of the security of communications transmitted by radio waves, see generally
Fred Jay Meyer, Note, Don’t Touch that Dial: Radio Listening Under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 416, 418-25 (1988). According
to Meyer, communication systems that rely on radio waves are less secure because
“they rely upon signals which are dispersed widely into public areas.” Id. at 419.
Systems such as land-line telephones and fiber optic transmission lines are more
secure because of their closed-circuit nature. Id. at 418-19.
11 Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf.
12 N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992), available at http://www.nhb
ar.org/pdfs/FO91-92-6.pdf.

250

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 83:2

Because the primary concern relating to the use of mobile
telephones was an overhearing or intercepting third party, the
relevant provision in the Model Rules was Rule 1.6. In the early
1990s, the relevant text of Rule 1.6 provided as follows: “A lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).”13
This duty not to disclose a client’s confidential information
implied a duty to communicate in a way that would provide a
reasonable expectation of privacy.14 Discharging this duty
required a lawyer to exercise professional judgment in choosing
the most appropriate method for the communication.15
Because of their concerns about confidentiality, some of the
first ethics committees to consider the issue required lawyers to
obtain express client consent after full disclosure of the risks
before using a mobile telephone for client communications.16 For
example, the Ethics Committee of the New Hampshire Bar
Association determined that the lawyer and client in a mobile
telephone conversation did not have a reasonable expectation of
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1995). Subsection (b) permitted
disclosure only to prevent the client from committing a crime likely to cause imminent
death or substantial bodily injury or to allow the lawyer to prepare a defense to an
action brought by the client or a criminal charge or claim based upon the lawyer’s
conduct involving the client. Id.
14 Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997),
available at http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/96-10.pdf; Hricik,
supra note 9, at 478-79; Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 9, at 475-78.
15 Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-2
(1999)), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions
/1999/Op%2099-002.doc (stating that nature of communication, client preferences,
changes in technology, and developments in law guide lawyer’s exercise of professional
judgment regarding selection of method of communication).
16 E.g.,
Mass. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 94-5 (1994), available at
http://www.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/1990-1999/1994/opinion-no-94-5
(“In our view, lawyers should not discuss confidential information on a cellular
telephone if there is any nontrivial risk that such information could be overhead by a
third party, whether that third party be involved in the particular matter or not.”);
N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992), available at http://www.nhbar.org/
pdfs/FO91-92-6.pdf. But see Ariz. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 95-11 (1995), available at
http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=463 (“However, the
time has not yet come when a lawyer’s mere use of a cellular phone to communicate
with the client—without resort to a scrambling device or exculpatory language at the
call’s beginning—constitutes an ethical breach.”).
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privacy because of the possibility of interception by a third party.17
As support for its position, the Ethics Committee cited federal
court decisions finding no expectation of privacy in cellular
telephone conversations for purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis.18 For those reasons, the Ethics Committee advised that
lawyers disclose the risk of mobile telephone conversations with
their clients and obtain express consent before proceeding.19 The
Ethics Committee did not limit its admonitions about mobile
telephone conversations to instances in which the lawyer uses a
mobile telephone.20 Rather, the Ethics Committee opined that a
lawyer who knows or has reason to know that the client is using a
mobile telephone to talk with the lawyer should warn the client of
the risks associated with its use.21
That the third party who might overhear the lawyer’s
conversation with the client would almost never be someone
involved in the legal matter did not alter the analysis.22 The fact
scenario proposed to the Massachusetts Bar Association assumed
that the mobile telephone conversations would take place in a
sparsely populated area with “almost no risk of interception by
parties with an interest in the subject matter of the call.”23 The
committee required the lawyer to obtain consent before using a
mobile telephone for confidential communications, regardless of
whether the eavesdropper was involved in the legal matter.24

17 N.H.
Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992), available at
http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/FO91-92-6.pdf.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. A one-time disclosure and consent given at the onset of the representation
would not have necessarily satisfied the New Hampshire Ethics Committee. Rather,
the Ethics Committee instructed lawyers to consider the sophistication of the client
and sensitivity of the communication in determining whether to obtain the client’s
consent before each use of a mobile telephone. Id.
22 Mass.
Bar
Ass’n,
Ethics
Op.
94-5
(1994),
available
at
http://www.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/1990-1999/1994/opinion-no-94-5;
see also N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992) available at
http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/FO91-92-6.pdf (determining that lawyer must obtain client’s
consent for mobile telephone conversation even when risks of interception were from
third party unrelated to subject matter of conversation).
23 Mass. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 94-5 (1994), available at http://www.massbar.org/pu
blications/ethics-opinions/1990-1999/1994/opinion-no-94-5.
24 Id.
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Not all ethics committees were so quick to limit a lawyer’s
use of mobile telephones. For example, the Arizona Committee on
the Rules of Professional Conduct analyzed a series of cases
considering whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
mobile telephone conversations for Fourth Amendment
purposes.25 The Arizona committee recognized the risk of
interception of the communication, but it refused to conclude that
the “mere use of a cellular phone to communicate with the client –
without resort to a scrambling device or exculpatory language at
the call’s beginning – constitutes an ethical breach.”26
Other ethics committees adopted a more case-by-case
approach to mobile telephones.27 For example, in a November 14,
1992 formal ethics opinion, the Ethics Committee of the Colorado
Bar Association analyzed a lawyer’s duty to preserve confidential
client communications when using technology.28 Specifically, the
committee considered the “[e]ver-increasing varieties of
communications products . . . , such as cordless telephones,
cellular telephones, facsimile machines, voice messaging and
computer modems.”29 Focusing specifically on cordless and cellular
telephone communications, the committee recognized the potential
that communications made through technology could be
intercepted.30 Because of the risks of interception and misdirected
communications, the committee recognized at least three
responsibilities for lawyers: (i) a duty to use reasonable care in the
selection of the mode of communications, (ii) a duty to use
See Ariz. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 95-11 (1995).
Id.
27 See Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 90-7 (1990)
(withdrawn); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 90-44 (1991),
available at http://www.iabar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f6686256497004ce492/4764
a33e255e9f02862564b2000f5939?OpenDocument (requiring lawyer to warn client that
conversations by mobile telephone are not confidential); N.C. State Bar, Op. RPC 215
(1995) (requiring lawyers to minimize risk of disclosure of mobile telephone
conversations by using reasonable care in selecting mode of communication and
warning client of risk of interception when lawyer has reason to know of risk).
28 Colo.
Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 90 (1992), available at
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Ethics/FormalEthicsOpion/FormalEthicsOpinion_90_2
011.pdf.
29 Id. The Ethics Committee recognized that advances in technology would
continue to make both the communication and the interception of those
communications easier. Id.
30 Id.
25
26
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reasonable care in using the technology, and (iii) a duty to warn
the client of the potential for interception of the confidential
information when an unsecure method is used.31
With respect to the use of the technology, the committee
provided several instructive examples of ways that even a
properly selected mode of communication can threaten the client’s
confidential information.32 According to the committee, a lawyer
must use reasonable care to avoid the unintended disclosure of
confidential information through facsimile or voice mail messages
sent to shared machines and voice mail messages left in the
incorrect mailbox.33 Although a still very new technology at the
time of the opinion, the committee emphasized that these same
risks of disclosure apply to “communications via computer modem
or electronic mail.”34 Finally, the committee imposed a duty on the
lawyer to warn the client or other parties to the communication
when the lawyer or other parties uses a mode of communication
that is unsecure or is “subject to relatively easy interception.”35
Once advances in technology36 changed the way in which
cordless and cellular telephones transmit signals, more ethics
committees began permitting the use, without prior client consent,
of some mobile telephones for client conversations.37 According to
some ethics committees, use of a cordless telephone still violated
the lawyer’s ethical obligations because the phones used radio
waves to transmit signals and could be intercepted by something

Id.
Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Derek D. Wood, The Emergence of Cellular and Cordless Telephones and the
Resulting Effect on the Tension Between Privacy and Wiretapping, 33 GONZ. L. REV.
377, 385-86 (1997).
37 See generally Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Op. 19 (1999) (“Digital
cordless and cellular telephones may be used by a lawyer to transmit and receive
confidential client information when used within a digital service area.”). Interestingly,
the Minnesota opinion did not include fax machines within its list of approved devices.
The Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board opined that facsimiles are problematic
because the communication could be viewed by persons other than the intended
recipient. Id. The Board said the same concerns applied to voice mail messages, but it
did not identify any concern with email. Id.
31
32
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as unsophisticated as a baby monitor.38 Lawyers, however, could
use cellular telephones and cordless telephones that relied on
digital technology to transmit signals because of the increased
difficulty in interception and criminal penalties for interception.39
Changes in the federal law imposing criminal penalties for
interception of cordless telephone conversations eventually led
some ethics committees to put cordless telephone conversations on
equal footing with digital cellular conversations.40

B. Email
In the mid-1990s, the focus of ethics committee opinions
shifted from mobile telephone conversations to unencrypted41
email.42 Although the ethics committees’ primary emphasis in
analyzing email focused on the same confidentiality concerns

38 See id. (permitting use of analog cordless or cellular telephone for confidential
client conversations only with client’s express prior consent after consultation); Del.
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf (describing split of authority regarding propriety
of using mobile telephones to communicate with clients); supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text. Prior to 1994, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act did not
protect conversations using cordless telephones, but it did protect cellular telephone
conversations. Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001) available
at http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf.; see Patricia M. Worthy, The Impact of New
and Emerging Telecommunications Technologies: A Call to the Rescue of the AttorneyClient Privilege, 39 HOW. L.J. 437, 448-49 (1996). Congress treated cellular telephones
differently than cordless telephones because, although both used radio technologies at
that time, cellular telephone conversations were considered more difficult to intercept.
In part because of this distinction in the legal consequences for interception and
because of perceived differences in the likelihood of interception of radio
communications used in cordless telephones, many courts found that cordless
telephone conversations were not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy under
Fourth Amendment analysis. See id. at 448-54 (analyzing treatment of radio
communications under case and statutory law).
39 Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Op. 19 (1999).
40 Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf.
41 Email messages can be “encrypted” to ensure that only the intended recipient
can access the message. To encrypt a message, the sender uses a computer program to
scramble the message, “locks” the message, and provides the “key” to the recipient that
can be used to “unlock” the message. See generally Hricik, supra note 9, at 493-96
(discussing process, merits, and drawbacks of encryption). Encrypted email messages,
therefore, do not raise the same confidentiality concerns as unencrypted ones.
42 The propriety of using email for client communications was a hot topic for legal
commentators in the 1990s. See Hricik, supra note 9, at 461.
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raised with mobile telephones,43 email posed additional ethical
concerns as well. Specifically, the ability to represent a client
without (perhaps even ever) meeting the client in person raised
concerns about the lawyer’s ability to represent competently and
to communicate adequately with the client.44
As email use became more prevalent and accepted, ethics
committees began focusing on how the lawyer and client were
using email.45 Specifically, ethics committees observed that the
lawyer’s and client’s choices regarding when and how to email
could impact its confidentiality. Thus, ethics committees began
requiring lawyers to consider the day-to-day use of technology in
making choices about its appropriateness.

1. Duty to Preserve Confidentiality of Client Information
The ethics committees’ consideration of email paralleled their
consideration of mobile telephones in many ways. Some of the first
ethics committees to consider the propriety of using unencrypted
email for client communications were hesitant about its use and
implemented stringent requirements.46 Much like with mobile
telephones, as the technology and law developed, however, most
ethics committees eventually became more permissive regarding
its use.47

a. Earliest Opinions Limit Use of Email
In January 1995, the Ethics Advisory Committee of the
South Carolina Bar Association issued the first ethics opinion
focusing specifically on the use of email to communicate with
clients.48 A physically disabled lawyer who wanted to represent
clients via a virtual law office provided the impetus for the
committee to consider the propriety of using email for confidential

See infra notes 47-94 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text.
48 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 94-27 (1995), available at
http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/ArticleI
d/507/Ethics-Advisory-Opinion-94-27.aspx.
43
44
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client information.49 Specifically, the lawyer proposed establishing
an on-line service through which the lawyer would provide general
information about legal matters and then represent individual
clients met through the on-line service.50 The lawyer proposed
using electronic media exclusively to communicate with the
client.51 The committee found that the use of a virtual law office
raised ethical questions with respect to advertising and
solicitation, client conflicts, unauthorized practice of law, and
client confidentiality.52
Considering what it determined to be an issue of first
impression, the committee opined as follows with respect to client
confidentiality: “Thus, it is the opinion of the committee that
unless certainty can be obtained regarding the confidentiality of
communications via electronic media, that representation of a
client, or communication with a client, via electronic media, may
violate Rule 1.6, absent an express waiver by the client.”53
In requiring an express waiver from the client for electronic
communications, the committee relied on ethics opinions from
Massachusetts, New York City, and New Hampshire analyzing
communications via cellular telephones and requiring client
consent when the conversation could be overheard.54 The
committee determined that email communication posed the same
threat of interception by a service provider.55
The South Carolina ethics committee was not alone in its
early concerns about the confidentiality of unencrypted email.
Specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics
and Conduct determined that a lawyer could communicate via
unencrypted email with a client with respect to “sensitive
Id.
Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Three years later, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee
determined that “improvements in technology and changes in the law” made a lawyer’s
expectation that electronic correspondence would be confidential reasonable and
permitted South Carolina lawyers to use email to communicate with clients. S.C. Bar
Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 97-08 (1997), available at
http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/ArticleI
d/561/Ethics-Advisory-Opinion-97-08.aspx.
49
50
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material” only with the express written consent of the client.56 The
board broadly defined “sensitive material” to include, at a
minimum, “information gained in the professional relationship
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client.”57 The board suggested that this definition be broadly
construed to provide the most protection to client
communications.58 This expansive reading of “sensitive
information” therefore suggests that the category of
communications for which unencrypted email communication
would be inappropriate extends beyond what the ethics rules
might define as “confidential.”
Other early state bar ethics committees also expressed
concern regarding the security of unencrypted email for
confidential client communication. For example, a 1995 opinion
from the North Carolina State Bar Ethics Committee warned
lawyers about the risk of interception of mobile telephone and
email communications.59 According to the opinion, anyone who
has access to the lawyer’s computer network (or presumably the
client’s computer network) can intercept an email.60 The opinion
instructed North Carolina lawyers to use reasonable care to select
the mode of communication that would best protect client
confidential information and to warn the other parties to the
communication if the lawyer knows or has reason to know of a
threat of its interception.61

56 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 97-01 (1997), available
at http://www.iabar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f6686256497004ce492/290d06050ed
025988625651c0050a51c?OpenDocument. In Opinion 97-01, the Board amended a prior
opinion. Id.
57 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 96-33 (1997), available
at http://www.iabar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f6686256497004ce492/29abd3c68930b
c03862564f400137b2b?OpenDocument.
58 Id. (“Certainly this would be a minimal test. Client’s judgment should be
augmented by counsel’s independent judgment. The Board believes the best guideline
would favor the most strict standards.”).
59 N.C.
State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. RPC 215 (1995), available at
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page=26&from=1/1995&to=12/1995.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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The newness of email technology led more than one ethics
committee to require consent for its use.62 In a 1997 informal
opinion, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility cautiously approached the
use of unencrypted email for communicating with clients.63 The
committee recognized that the threat of interception of email is
similar to the threat for other modes of communicating, but
determined that the relative newness and differing opinions
regarding the security of electronic communication warranted
different treatment.64 Although the committee rejected encryption
for most communications, the committee determined that
communicating via email with clients necessitated client
consent.65
Echoing a similar concern about the developing knowledge
base for email, a Missouri informal advisory opinion required
Missouri lawyers to inform clients of the nature of the risks of
unencrypted electronic communication before using it.66 A later
opinion rejected the notion that a standard consent form would be
adequate to satisfy the lawyer’s consent requirement.67 According
to the opinion, the appropriateness of unencrypted email depends
on the setting in which the client sends and receives email as well
as the information being communicated.68 The opinion also
described the relevant risks of the communication as extending
beyond the concern that the communication could be intercepted
and including shared access to the communication through a home

62 Mo. Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Op. 980137 (1998),
available at http://www.mobar.org/ethics/InformalOpinionsSearch.aspx; Pa. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 97-130 (1997).
63 See Pa. Bar. Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 97-130
(1997).
64 Id.
65 Id. (“A lawyer has complied with his or her ethical obligations if the risks and
benefits associated with the use of email are explained to the client and the client
consents. Lawyer and client together can agree to use e-mail for all, some or none of
their communications. They can also agree whether or not to use encryption.”).
66 Mo. Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Op. 980137 (1998),
available at http://www.mobar.org/ethics/InformalOpinionsSearch.aspx.
67 Mo. Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Op. 990007 (1999),
available at http://www.mobar.org/ethics/InformalOpinionsSearch.aspx.
68 Id.
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or work computer and the perpetual life span of electronic
documents.69
Finally, even some ethics committees that refused to require
lawyers to encrypt all client email recommended that lawyers
warn their clients about the risk of interception, primarily because
of a concern that clients were unaware of the risk associated with
email.70 For example, the Connecticut Committee on Professional
Ethics opined as follows:
[The lawyer’s] fundamental responsibilities require, at a
minimum, that a lawyer (1) consult with the client to ensure
that the client is aware of risks involved in using unencrypted
email for confidential communications, and (2) use good
judgment and discretion in choosing an appropriate method
for communicating confidential client information, and
counsel his or her client to do likewise. 71

Because the Model Rules put the burden on the lawyer to use
reasonable efforts to protect the client’s confidential information,
the lawyer is responsible for making certain that the client does
not communicate with the lawyer in a way that jeopardizes the
confidential information.72 The Arizona Bar Association went a
step further and suggested that Arizona lawyers state in the
subject line or in the beginning of the email the privileged nature
of the communication.73

b. Majority Approach Permits Use of Email in Most
Circumstances
Like with mobile telephones, ethics committees became more
permissive of the use of unencrypted email for client
communications over time and eventually developed a majority
trend allowing its use under most circumstances. Specifically, the
majority of ethics committees that have considered the issue have
Id.
Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 98-2 (1998), available at
https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/98_2.html; Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999).
71 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999).
72 Id.
73 Ariz. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-04 (1997), available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/
EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=480.
69
70
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now determined that communicating via unencrypted email does
not pose risks that are new or more significant than the risks
posed by other modes of communicating that are well-accepted.74
In addition, those jurisdictions have emphasized that intercepting
electronic communications is illegal.75 For those reasons, the
majority of jurisdictions, including the ABA,76 have permitted
lawyers to communicate via email with clients without encryption
or prior client consent, unless unusual circumstances exist.77
See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
76 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (“A
lawyer may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by
unencrypted email sent over the Internet without violating the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable
expectation of privacy from a technological and legal standpoint.”).
77 See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 98-2 (1998) (“[A]n attorney is free
to communicate using e-mail on any matters with a client that the attorney would
otherwise feel free to discuss over the telephone or via fax transmission.”); Ariz. State
Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-04 (1997), available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/V
iewEthicsOpinion?id=480 (“[I]t is not unethical to communicate with a client via e-mail
even if the e-mail is not encrypted.”); Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 9952 (1999) (“Therefore, in the committee’s view a lawyer may, under ordinary
circumstances, use unencrypted email for communicating matters relating to
representation of a client without violating Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.”); Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf (“The transmission of confidential information by
way of e-mail . . . , absent extraordinary circumstances, does not violate Rule 1.6.”);
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 281 (1998), available at http://www.dcbar
.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion281.cfm (“We conclude that the use
of unencrypted electronic mail is not, by itself, a violation of Rule 1.6.”); Fla. Bar
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 00-4 (2000), available at http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/
tfbetopin.nsf/SearchView/ETHICS,+OPINION+00-4?opendocument (“An attorney may
communicate with the client using unencrypted e-mail under most circumstances.”);
Haw. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Formal Op. 40 (2001), available at
http://www.odchawaii.com/uploads/FO_40_-_E-MAIL_SECURITY.pdf (“An attorney
may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by encrypted or
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating HRPC 1.6(a).”); Ill. State
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997), available at
http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/96-10.pdf; Me. Prof’l Ethics
Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index
.php?topic=mebar_overseers_ethics_opinions&id=63338&v=article (“The Commission
concludes that, as a general matter and subject to appropriate safeguards, an attorney
may utilize unencrypted e-mail without violating the attorney’s ethical obligation to
maintain client confidentiality.”); Mass. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 00-1 (2000), available at
http://www.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/2000-2009/2000/opinion-no-00-1
(“A lawyer’s use of unencrypted Internet e-mail to engage in confidential
communications with his or her client does not violate Massachusetts Rule of
74
75
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Ethics committees decided that the use of unencrypted email
to communicate with a client did not violate the lawyer’s
obligations under Rule 1.6 not because the use of email did not
pose risks of interception, but because those risks were not
materially different from older, more established forms of
communication. In a 1999 opinion, the Committee on Professional
Ethics for the Connecticut Bar Association described the potential
ways in which an email might be intercepted.78 First, although
extremely unlikely, one could intercept a particular email in
transit from the sender to the recipient.79 Because of the way
email is transmitted via the Internet,80 the committee determined
that it was highly unlikely that an individual could target a
particular email and intercept it.81 Two other scenarios, however,
posed more likely examples of interception. Using a software
program, one could monitor any email messages that are sent
through a certain computer or computer network.82 In addition, a
system administrator could monitor or access emails sent through
a computer or computer network.83
Professional Conduct 1.6(a) in usual circumstances.”); Minn. Lawyers Prof’l
Responsibility Bd., Op. 19 (1999) (“E-mail without encryption may be used to transmit
and receive confidential client information.”); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. 709 (1998), available at http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.
aspx?id=5550 (“We therefore conclude that lawyers may in ordinary circumstances
utilize unencrypted Internet e-mail to transmit confidential information without
breaching their duties of confidentiality under Canon 4 to their clients, as the
technology is in use today.”); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op.
99-2 (1999) (“[A] lawyer does not violate the duty to preserve confidences and secrets
under DR 4-101 of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility by communicating with
clients through electronic mail without encryption.”); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory
Op. Comm., Op. 00-01 (2000), available at http://www.utahbar.org/ethics-advisoryopinions/eaoc-00-01/ (“A lawyer may, in ordinary circumstances, use unencrypted
Internet e-mail to transmit client confidential information without violating the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct.”); Vt. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Advisory Ethics
Op. 97-05 (1997), available at http://www.vtbar.org/UserFiles/Files/WebPages/Attorney
%20Resources/aeopinions/Advisory%20Ethics%20Opinions/Lawyer%27s%20Duty/9705.pdf (“A lawyer does not violate DR 4-101 by communicating with a client by e-mail,
including the Internet, without encryption.”).
78 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999).
79 Id.
80 For a helpful description of how the Internet transmits email, see Hricik, supra
note 9, at 462-69.
81 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999).
82 Id.
83 Id.
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Even older, established forms of communication such as landline telephone calls, letters through the postal service, or courier
deliveries are subject to interception.84 For example, the Ethics
Committee of the Illinois State Bar Association reasoned that
Illinois lawyers could communicate via email85 with clients
without encryption or prior consent by analogizing email to a
landline telephone call.86 The committee reasoned that both forms
of communication were susceptible to interception but that federal
law prohibited that interception.87 Because a lawyer undoubtedly
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the landline telephone
call, the lawyer also has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
email.88 In addition, the ABA determined that privacy policies
governing the lawyer’s email account would limit the threat that a
system administrator would monitor email.89
Ethics committees almost universally recognize a caveat to
the general rule: emails of a highly sensitive nature require
heightened security measures.90 These ethics committees have
almost universally rejected the notion that all emails should be
treated identically. Rather, emails that contain highly sensitive or
See Hricik, supra note 9, at 479-81, 496.
The Illinois opinion describes the different ways that email can be transmitted
from the sender to the recipient: “through a private or local area network (within a
single firm or organization), through an electronic mail service (such as America
Online, CompuServ or MCI Mail), over the Internet, or through any combination of
these methods.” Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10
(1997), Under the majority trend, emails transmitted through any of these methods are
subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.; see also Hricik, supra note 9, at 485506.
86 Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997). Several
other state ethics committees have explicitly adopted the rationale of the Illinois
opinion. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. E-403 (1998), available at
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e-403.pdf; State Bar Ass’n of
N.D. Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 97-09 (1997), available at http://www.sband.org/userf
iles/files/pdfs/ethics/97-09.pdf (relying on Illinois, South Carolina, and Vermont ethics
opinions); Vt. Bar Ass’n Comm. of Prof’l Responsibility, Advisory Ethics Op. 97-05
(1997).
87 Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997).
88 Id.
89 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
90 See, e.g., id. (“The Committee recognizes that there may be unusual
circumstances involving an extraordinarily sensitive matter that might require
enhanced security measures like encryption. These situations would, however, be of the
nature that ordinary telephones and other normal means of communication would also
be deemed inadequate.”).
84
85
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confidential matters require different treatment. Some ethics
committees have opined that lawyers in that state should obtain
express client consent before emailing regarding highly sensitive
or confidential matters.91 The prevailing wisdom among other
ethics committees is that enhanced security measures, like
encryption, may be necessary for communications that involve
“extraordinarily sensitive matters.”92
Though most ethics committees have not required prior client
consent or encryption in order for a lawyer to use email to
communicate with clients, those ethics committees have
emphasized that lawyers have an obligation to follow the client’s
instructions with respect to the method of communication.93
Therefore, regardless of whether that jurisdiction permits the
lawyer to use email for client communications, the client’s
instructions or preferences for some other form of communication
prevail. The Maine Professional Ethics Commission offered the
91 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999); Mass. Bar Ass’n,
Ethics Op. 00-1 (2000).
92 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413
(1999); Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 98-2 (1998); Mass. Bar Ass’n, Op. 00-1
(2000); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. 709 (1998); State Bar Ass’n of N.D. Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 97-09 (1997),
available at http://www.sband.org/userfiles/files/pdfs/ethics/97-09.pdf; Utah State Bar
Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 00-01 (2000); Vt. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Responsibility, Advisory Ethics Op. 97-05 (1997). The Arizona Bar Association
recommended that lawyers encrypt communications that contain “highly sensitive
information.” Ariz. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-04 (1997), available at http://www.azbar.
org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=480. Although the North Dakota
opinion carved out an exception for “extraordinarily sensitive” communications like the
Illinois opinion did, the scope of the question that the committee considered was
limited to just “routine matters.” State Bar Ass’n of N.D. Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 9709 (1997), available at http://www.sband.org/userfiles/files/pdfs/ethics/97-09.pdf (“Is
Rule 1.6 . . . violated by a lawyer who communicates routine matters with clients,
and/or other lawyers jointly representing clients . . . ?”). The opinion does not make
clear whether “routine matters” includes confidential client information that does not
meet the threshold for “extraordinarily sensitive.” See id. Likewise, the South Carolina
Bar Ethics Advisory Committee opined that South Carolina lawyers could
communicate with clients via email, but it observed that “A lawyer should discuss with
a client such options as encryption in order to safeguard against even inadvertent
disclosure of sensitive or privileged information when using e-mail.” S.C. Bar Ethics
Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 97-08 (1997), available at http://www.scbar.org
/MemberResources/EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/ArticleId/561/EthicsAdvisory-Opinion-97-08.aspx.
93 Mass. Bar Ass’n, Op. 00-1 (2000); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics,
Op. 709 (1998); Utah Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 00-01 (2000).
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following general guidance: “[A]ttorneys should discuss with
clients their preferred method(s) of communication and follow the
client’s wishes, should consider the degree of confidentiality of
particular information in determining appropriate means to send
it, and should take reasonable precautions to make sure that the
address is correct and properly targeted.”94
Therefore, by the early 2000s, most jurisdictions permitted
lawyers to use unencrypted email for client communications, so
long as the communication was not regarding an extraordinarily
sensitive matter or contrary to client instructions.

2. Duties to Provide Competent Representation and to
Communicate with the Client
In analyzing a lawyer’s proposed use of technology to
communicate with a client, ethics committees have also stressed
the role of the lawyer’s duty of competence and duty to
communicate with the client. Rule 1.1 requires that a lawyer
“provide competent representation.”95 It defines “competent
representation” as follows: “Competent representation requires
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”96 Rule 1.4 requires
the lawyer to keep the client “reasonably informed” about the
status of the matter, promptly respond to the client’s inquiries,
and explain matters to the client in sufficient detail so that the
client can make informed decisions about the representation.97
In analyzing a lawyer’s duty of competence, ethics
committees have emphasized that the standards that govern a
lawyer’s conduct are constant regardless of the method that the
lawyer uses to communicate with the client.98 For example, the
Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct/rule_1_1_competence.html.
96 Id.
97 MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rule
s_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_4_communications.html.
98 Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Va. State Bar, Op. 1791 (2003), available
at http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1791.htm; see also N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op.
10 (2006) (“While the Internet is a tool of convenience and appears to respond to the
94
95
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Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics pointed
out that the descriptions of the obligations in Rule 1.1 all pertain
to the “content” of the representation and do not prescribe a
method for delivering that content.99
Ethics committees have reasoned similarly with respect to
the lawyer’s duty to communicate with the client under Rule 1.4.
Like it stated about the lawyer’s duties under Rule 1.1, the
Virginia ethics committee explained that Rule 1.4 focuses on the
content of the lawyer’s communications with the client rather
than the method of delivery.100 So long as the lawyer
communicates the necessary information to the client, the lawyer
complies with Rule 1.4 regardless of whether the lawyer meets
with the client in-person or uses technology to convey the
information.
Using technology, however, can make compliance with the
ethical obligations of Rule 1.1 and 1.4 more challenging. For
example, with respect to using technology to communicate with
clients, the lawyer’s duties to keep client information confidential
and to act competently are necessarily intermingled. According to
the authorities, a lawyer who does not analyze and minimize the
risks associated with using technology to communicate with
clients potentially violates the lawyer’s duty of competence.101 For
instance, in its 2011 opinion describing a lawyer’s duty to warn a
client about using technology to communicate when the factual
context posed an increased risk of access by a third party, the ABA
ethics committee relied on both Rule 1.1 and Rule 1.6.102
Even beyond the concern about whether the lawyer is giving
competent advice to the client with respect to the confidentiality of
consumer’s need for fast solutions, the cyber lawyer must still deliver competent
representation. To this end, he or she should make every effort to make the same
inquiries, to engage in the same level of communication, and to take the same
precautions as a competent lawyer does in a law office setting.”).
99 Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Va. State Bar, Op. 1791 (2003)
(“Whether that procedure involves the provision of competent legal services depends on
the content, not the method of communication; what does determine competency in this
situation is whether the attorney reviews the proper materials and law, imparts to the
client all necessary information, receives necessary direction from the client as to the
client’s objectives, and provides appropriate legal advice as a result.”).
100 Id.
101 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
102 Id.
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communication via technology,103 the lawyer’s use of technology
can also raise questions about the substance of the representation.
Specifically, through using technology, a lawyer can represent a
client without ever meeting with the client in-person.104
Representing a client without in-person contact poses several
risks, including that the lawyer lacks a complete understanding of
the underlying facts or that the client does not understand the
lawyer’s advice.
Only communication that is meaningful and capable of being
understood by the client satisfies the lawyer’s ethical duty to
communicate with the client. In addition to arising in the context
of virtual law offices, an emphasis on the need for the
communication to be meaningful has arisen in the context of
lawyers who use a different language to communicate than their
clients.105 For example, according to the California State Bar
Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct,
if the lawyer cannot engage in meaningful communication with
103 The use of technology poses other issues relating to the lawyer’s provision of
competent representation. For example, one ethics committee has pointed out that a
lawyer cannot rely on an on-line discussion of a legal issue as a substitute for
conducting the necessary legal research. See Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Prof’l
Conduct, Advisory Op. 12-15 (2012), available at http://www.isba.org/sites/default
/files/ethicsopinions/12-15.pdf.
104 See Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999),
available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/1999/O
p%2099-009.doc (considering whether Ohio ethical rules permit lawyer to conduct “online representation of clients through email questions and answers”). Ethics
committees have considered other instances of representation without in-person
contact between the lawyer and the client that do not involve technology. See, e.g.,
State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. RI-349
(2010), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ri349.cfm?CFID=58744146&CFTOKEN=fc8865fad05127c6-5F49C037-1A4B-3375E41BF353F0566041 (use of non-lawyer assistants); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Ethics Advisory Op. 05-16 (2005), available at http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/
EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/ArticleId/708/Ethics-Advisory-Opinion-0516.aspx (real estate closings “by mail”). With respect to conducting real estate closings
by mail, the South Carolina ethics committee opined that the lawyer’s ethical
obligations do not depend on whether the closing is conducted in person or by mail.
Rather, in either instance, the lawyer must be accessible to the client “by telephone,
facsimile, or electronic transmission.” Id.
105 See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct,
Formal Op. 1984-77 (1984), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?file
ticket=hQaC_moHrkc%3d&tabid=841 (considering ethical obligations of lawyer who
speaks a different language than client).
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the client in the lawyer’s language, “the attorney must take all
reasonable steps to insure that the client comprehends the legal
concepts involved and the advice given . . . .”106 Those steps might
include hiring an interpreter or associating a bilingual lawyer.107
The lack of in-person communication may make it difficult for
the lawyer to determine whether the communication with the
client satisfies this standard of “meaningful.” In an in-person
meeting with the lawyer, the client’s non-verbal and verbal cues
will help the lawyer determine whether the client understands the
information being communicated.108 In the context of electronic
communications like email, however, the lawyer cannot easily
gauge the client’s understanding and, perhaps even more
disconcerting, whether the client is in fact the person with whom
the lawyer is communicating.109 Other technologies, such as video
conferencing, perhaps alleviate some of these concerns because
they allow the lawyer to see the non-verbal and to hear the verbal
cues from the client.
These same concerns arise for clients who might be less
familiar with or have less access to technology than the lawyer.
Even with the prevalence of technology in today’s society, the
lawyer cannot assume that the client has access to the technology
and the necessary skill set to use it.110 If the client cannot or does
not have access to the technology, no “communication” occurs.
Furthermore, even if the communication is accessed, the lawyer
has no guarantee that the person accessing the communication is
in fact the client.111
Because ethics committees have not subjected electronic
communications to a different standard than other types of
communications, the requirements are neither more nor less
stringent for electronic communications than a land-line telephone
call or a traditional letter. Thus, the electronic communication,
just like the telephone call or letter, must be the product of
competent representation and be meaningful communication.
Id.
Id.
108 Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Draft
Formal Op. 2010-0003 (2010).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See Hricik, supra note 9, at 470.
106
107
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3. Duty to Avoid Using Email in a Way that Compromises Its
Confidentiality
Other ethics opinions, notably the most recent ones, identify
an additional class of cases in which communication via
unencrypted email is problematic: factual contexts involving a
heightened risk of interception.
Under certain circumstances, a lawyer’s work habits can
expose client communications to a heightened risk of
interception.112 For example, in a 2010 opinion, the Standing
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the
California State Bar considered a fact pattern that represents a
fairly typical practice model for firm associates: use of a firm
laptop to work on client matters at home or in public places.113
The committee enumerated a list of factors that a lawyer should
consider in using any technological device: security risks posed by
the particular type of technology, including the availability of
reasonable precautions; legal consequences of interfering with the
communication; the sensitivity of the particular information; the
effect on the client of disclosure of the information; the “urgency of
the situation”; and the client’s instructions and circumstances.114
With respect to the lawyer’s use of the laptop, the committee
opined that the lawyer potentially violates the duties of
confidentiality and competence by using public wireless Internet
access absent encryption and a personal firewall.115
To use technology ethically, a lawyer must also consider how
the client uses technology and warn the client of associated risks.
In a 2011 Formal Ethics Opinion, the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility recognized that the client’s
manner of using technology could threaten the security of the

112 Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal
Op. 2010-179 (2010), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket
=wmqECiHp7h4%3d&tabid=836.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. (“Depending on the sensitivity of the matter, Attorney may need to avoid
using the public wireless connection entirely or notify Client of possible risks attendant
to his use of the public wireless connection, including potential disclosure of
confidential information and possible waiver of attorney-client privilege or work
product protections, and seek her informed consent to do so.”).
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communication.116 For example, a client’s email correspondence
with a lawyer may be accessible by third parties if the client is
using the employer’s email account, computer, smartphone, or
device to email with the lawyer and the employer’s policies
provide that the employer has a right of access to the account or
device.117 A lawyer or perhaps even a third party who subpoenas
the employer’s email records could also access the
communications.118 Similarly, other members of the client’s
household may be able to access the client’s communications with
the lawyer if the client has a shared email account.119 According to
the ABA committee, if a lawyer has reason to know that the client
may use email to communicate in one of these ways, the lawyer
has an ethical obligation to warn the client of the risk that a third
party will read the communication and to refrain from emailing
the client in a way that poses a risk of access by a third party.120
116 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/11_459_nm_formal_opinion.pdf.
117 Id.
118 Id. In Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center Inc., the court described the effect of
the employer’s ownership of and right to access email communications as follows:
“[T]he effect of an employer email policy, such as that of BI, is to have the employer
looking over your shoulder each time you send an email.” Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr.
Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
119 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011); see also
Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l. Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001) (“Inevitably,
circumstances may arise where there is a genuine risk of unauthorized access. For
example, a lawyer representing one spouse in a matrimonial proceeding might need to
refrain from communicating with the client by way of email if the other spouse shares
access to a computer at their shared residence.”); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195
(2008) (“When exercising professional judgment in choosing a particular form of
communication, lawyers should consider both the content of the communication as well
as the security of the email address to which it is being sent. For example, an attorney
representing a client in a divorce would generally not send sensitive advice in a letter
to a client’s home address if the couple had not yet separated. Similarly, lawyers
should be sensitive to the fact that others may have access to a client’s email address,
especially at home. Likewise, some places of business routinely monitor their
employees’ email and often have access to it.”). In a 1998 ethics opinion, the D.C. Bar
Association similarly warned lawyers about the risks to confidentiality posed by the
client’s manner of using technology. Although it used a facsimile delivered to the
shared mail room of a client in a dispute with the employer as an example, its
emphasis on the particular factual context mirrors that of the ABA. D.C. Bar Legal
Ethics Comm., Op. 281 (1998), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics
/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion281.cfm.
120 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
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Not only do lawyers who communicate with a client when the
client is using an employer’s email account or device risk an
ethical violation, they also risk having to produce the
communication in litigation because some courts have found that
the attorney-client privilege does not attach or is waived in these
circumstances.121 For example, in Scott v. Beth Israel Medical
Center Inc., the court determined that the attorney-client privilege
did not apply to email correspondence between a lawyer and client
when the client used the employer’s email account to communicate
with the lawyer and the employer’s handbook provided that the
employer owned and had a right to access any communications
sent through the account or the employer’s systems.122 Similarly,
in Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington ruled that a client
did not have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality when the
client used an employer-issued laptop to create or send
communications to the lawyer, even though the client used a webbased email program for the communication.123 The client did not
have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the
communications because the employer retained the right to access
the computer in the employee handbook and the employer could
access any communication that was sent through its server.124 The
court found that the client had waived any privilege that might
have previously attached to communications between the lawyer

121 See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Against Employer Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64
S.C. L. REV. 323, 351-55 (2012); Louise L. Hill, Personal Use of Workplace Computers:
A Threat to Otherwise Privileged Communications, 15 J. INTERNET L. 20, 20 (2012);
Kara R. Williams, Note, Protecting What You Thought Was Yours: Expanding
Employee Privacy to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from Employer Computer
Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 365-67 (2008).
122 847 N.Y.S.2d at 439-44 (2007). The court described the effect of the employer’s
ownership of and right to access email communications as follows: “[T]he effect of an
employer e-mail policy, such as that of BI, is to have the employer looking over your
shoulder each time you send an e-mail.” Id. at 440. But see Curto v. Med. World
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006)
(finding that employee who used employer-issued laptop to access a web-based email
account in her home did not waive any applicable attorney-client or work product
privilege that might otherwise apply).
123 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1108, 1110 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
124 Id.
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and client that the client later saved on the employer-issued
laptop.125
Personal, password-protected, web-based emails that an
employee sends or accesses via the employer’s computer fare
better in some jurisdictions. For example, in Stengart v. Loving
Care Agency, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court determined
that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
personal, password-protected email that she sent through her
web-based account when she did not save the password on the
employer’s computer and the employer’s policy was ambiguous
regarding the employer’s rights to web-based emails.126 The
Stengart court suggested that even a policy in an unambiguous
company handbook that “banned all personal computer use and
provided unambiguous notice that an employer could retrieve and
read an employee’s lawyer-client communications” might be
unenforceable.127
At least one commentator has suggested that this concern
about third party access to an email account might extend beyond
the employer-employee or domestic dispute contexts.128
Specifically, when the ABA and the majority of state ethics
committees determined that lawyers could use unencrypted email
for client communications in the 1990s, they assumed that the
service provider would not retain a copy of the email for an
extended period of time and that the agreement between the
service provider and the customer would protect, rather than
limit, the email’s confidentiality.129 Today’s more lengthy and
complex privacy agreements may not provide the protections that
the ABA and other state ethics committees assumed existed or
that did exist at that time.130

Id. at 1109.
990 A.2d 650, 663-65 (N.J. 2010).
127 Id. at 665.
128 Rebecca Bolin, Risky Mail: Concerns in Confidential Attorney-Client Email, 81
U. CIN. L. REV. 601, 632-48 (2012).
129 Id. at 640-48.
130 Id. at 641.
125
126
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Other concerns relating to the use of email to communicate
with clients relate to the delivery of the communication.131 For
example, much like the facsimile message that can be picked up
by anyone with access to the facsimile machine, so too may an
email be read by anyone who sees it on the computer screen.132
Email can also be misdirected and sent to an unknown third party
or perhaps even an opposing litigant.133 Finally, a third party
could respond to an email from the lawyer purporting to be the
client and the lawyer would be none the wiser.134
Thus, the lawyer has an affirmative duty to both use
technology in a way that does not compromise confidentiality, and
to monitor the client’s use of technology to ensure communication
confidentiality.

II. CHANGES TO THE MODEL RULES TO REFLECT THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGY ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Because of its effect on the way lawyers practice, the use of
technology by lawyers has led to two efforts to amend the Model
Rules. Specifically, in both 1997 and 2009, the ABA formed
commissions to study and propose revisions to the Model Rules to
resolve concerns brought about by the use of technology. Both
efforts ended in changes to the Model Rules and therefore altered
the ethical landscape for practicing lawyers.

A. Ethics 2000
In 1997, the ABA formed the Ethics 2000 Commission to
conduct a wholesale review of the Model Rules for the first time
since 1983.135 One of the issues providing the backdrop against
which the Ethics 2000 Commission considered amendments to the
rules included “the impact of technology and globalization.”136 The

131 As stated in note 7, other ethics opinions and provisions of the Model Rules
analyze the effect of the misdirected communication on the lawyer’s responsibilities.
These opinions and provisions of the Model Rules are beyond the scope of this Article.
132 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999).
133 Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008).
134 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
135 Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 441 (2002).
136 Id. at 442.
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Ethics 2000 Commission’s amendments, however, included no
changes to the black letter law of the Model Rules relating to a
lawyer’s use of technology to communicate with the client but
rather changes to the comments for Rules 1.4 and 1.6.
With respect to Rule 1.4, the Ethics 2000 Commission’s
acknowledgment of the impact of technology on the lawyer’s duty
to communicate with the client came in the form of an admonition
to lawyers to promptly return or acknowledge the telephone calls
of their clients.137 Specifically, the Ethics 2000 Commission
recommended, and the House of Delegates approved, the following
addition to language in Comment 4 that required a lawyer to
respond promptly to client inquiries: “Client telephone calls
should be promptly returned or acknowledged.”138 According to the
Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, and perhaps as a sign of the
prevalent use of the telephone for lawyer/client communications,
the Ethics 2000 Commission “thought that emphasis should be
given to promptly returning or at least acknowledging receipt of
phones calls.”139
The Ethics 2000 Commission proposed more substantial
changes to Rule 1.6. Specifically, the approved changes to Rule 1.6
included two new comments relating to the lawyer’s duty to
protect the client’s confidential information. First, the Ethics 2000
Commission added Comment 15, explaining that the lawyer has
an affirmative duty to act competently to protect the client’s
confidential information against inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure by the lawyer or those working with the lawyer.140
Second, the Ethics 2000 Commission added Comment 16,
which gives the lawyer guidance in discharging this duty. This
guidance reflects the tenor of the then recent ethics committee
opinions analyzing email communications. Specifically, much like

137 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4, cmt. 4 (2002). According to the
Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, “the Commission thought that emphasis should be
given to promptly returning or at least acknowledging receipt of phone calls.” ABA
Ethics 2000 Comm’n, Reporter’s Explanation of Changes: Model Rule 1.4 (2000)
[hereinafter Reporter’s Explanation of Changes: Model Rule 1.4], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_com
mission/e2k_rule14rem.html.
138 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4, cmt. 4 (2002).
139 Reporter’s Explanation of Changes: Model Rule 1.4, supra note 137.
140 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2002).
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the state and ABA ethics opinions, Comment 16 cautions the
lawyer to consider the sensitivity of the information and legal
consequence to those who might intercept the communication in
determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s expectation of
privacy.141 It also warns the lawyer to consider the special
circumstances surrounding the communication and instructions to
the client in deciding whether additional security measures might
be necessary.142 According to the Reporter’s Explanation of
Changes, the Ethics 2000 Commission recognized the backdrop of
the ethics committee opinions analyzing the use of unencrypted
email to communicate with clients, but did not limit its guidance
to email.

B. Ethics 20/20
Seven years later, at the end of its 2009 annual meeting, the
ABA announced the formation of the ABA Commission on Ethics
20/20 (“Ethics 20/20 Commission”).143 The stated purpose of the
Ethics 20/20 Commission was to consider the impact of technology
and globalization on the practice of law.144 Carolyn B. Lamm, the
president of the ABA at that time, explained, “Technologies such
as email, the Internet and smart phones are transforming the way
we practice law and our relationship with clients, just as they
have compressed our world and expanded international business
opportunities for our clients.”145
In particular, the Ethics 20/20 Commission identified three
categories for its work: the regulation of lawyers who practice in
multiple states and countries, “advances in technology that
enhance virtual cross-border access,” and “other challenges
presented by changing technology, including ‘data security and
confidentiality.’”146 The Ethics 20/20 Commission further
explained that the third category included the following subtopics:
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2002).
Id.
143 News Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics
Commission to Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing
U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/media
/release/news_release.cfm?releaseid=730.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 25 LAW. MAN. PROF’L CONDUCT 694 (Dec. 9, 2009).
141
142
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“access to justice, competence, data security and confidentiality;
and jurisdictional issues in lawyer discipline.”147 In its “Issues
Paper” soliciting comments, the Ethics 20/20 Commission’s
working group identified cloud computing and portable electronic
devices as posing confidentiality issues.148 With respect to the use
of portable electronic devices, the proposed areas of focus included
protection of data stored on a portable electronic device in case it
is lost or stolen and protection of information transmitted via the
device.149
The Ethics 20/20 Commission proposed amendments to Rules
1.1, 1.4, and 1.6 at its May meeting.150 On August 6, 2012, the
House of Delegates considered and approved the Ethics 20/20
Commission’s
proposals
relating
to
technology
and
confidentiality.151
As discussed above, ethics committees analyzing the
propriety of lawyers using technology to communicate with their
clients had consistently stated that Rule 1.1 implicitly required
the lawyer to analyze and minimize the risks associated with
using technology to communicate with a client.152 According to the
Ethics 20/20 Commission, Rule 1.1’s requirement that lawyers
“keep abreast of changes in the law” already implicitly required
that lawyers be knowledgeable about changes in technology and

Id.
Client Confidentiality Issues Paper, supra note 2; see also 26 LAW. MAN. PROF’L
CONDUCT 586 (Sept. 29, 2010).
149 Client Confidentiality Issues Paper, supra note 2.
150 The Ethics 20/20 Commission’s proposed revisions to the Model Rules underwent
minor changes throughout the comment period. For example, the earliest proposed
revisions did not include any changes to Rule 1.4, and the amendment to Rule 1.1 did
not limit the technology about which the lawyer should stay updated to “relevant”
technology. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INITIAL DRAFT PROPOSALS – TECH. AND
CONFIDENTIALITY (May 2, 2011), available at http.//www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/20110502_technology.authcheckda
m.pdf.
151 The House of Delegates also considered the Ethics 20/20 Commission’s proposed
amendments to the Model Rules relating to technology and client development, lawyer
mobility, and outsourcing. See INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW, supra note 1. The Ethics
20/20 Commission proposed, and the House of Delegates approved, a second set of
amendments on February 11, 2013. Those amendments related to foreign-licensed
lawyers and to choice of law provisions in lawyer/client agreements. 29 LAW. MAN.
PROF’L CONDUCT 101 (Feb. 13, 2013).
152 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
147
148
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their impact on client confidentiality.153 It decided that this
obligation needed to be explicit:154 “To maintain the requisite
knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in
the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks
associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study
and education and comply with all continuing legal education
requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”155
Interestingly, the amendment implies that a lawyer who does
not use technology when technology would benefit the client does
not provide competent representation.156 Indeed, in its Report to
the House of Delegates, the Ethics 20/20 Commission observed
that competent representation requires that a lawyer be able to
use basic technology to send email or create an electronic
document.157 By including the duty to keep abreast of the benefits
of technology, the Commission suggests that failing to use
technology could, in some situations, violate the lawyer’s ethical
obligations. A situation in which such a violation could arise might
involve the lawyer’s duty to communicate with the client and keep
the client reasonably informed under Rule 1.4. Under some
situations, the lawyer’s duties under Rule 1.1 to know of the
benefits of technology and Rule 1.4 to communicate promptly
might require the lawyer to use the most expedient mode of
communication. Perhaps the lawyer who prefers to communicate
by letter, telephone, or in person might find that the amended

153 ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3 (Aug. 6,
2012) [hereinafter ETHICS 20/20 REPORT], available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed
_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
154 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 8.
155 ETHICS 20/20 REPORT, supra note 153, at 3.
156 The focus of this Article is on the lawyer’s use of technology and how this new
duty under Rule 1.1 impacts the use of technology for client communications. This new
duty, however, could have much broader implications, including the lawyer’s
knowledge regarding how technology impacts the client’s business. See Jon M. Garon,
Technology Requires Reboot of Professionalism and Ethics for Practitioners, 16 J.
INTERNET L. 3, 4-5 (2012) (“The duty is not to become technologically savvy so much as
to understand the impact technologies will have on a client’s activities and the
activities of the law firm.”).
157 ETHICS 20/20 REPORT, supra note 153, at 3 (“For example, a lawyer would have
difficulty providing competent legal services in today’s environment without knowing
how to use email or create an electronic document.”).
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Model Rules require the use of technology in order to
communicate “promptly.”158
The approved amendment to Rule 1.4 reflects the reality of
the different ways that lawyers communicate with their clients.
As discussed above, as part of Ethics 2000, the Comments to Rule
1.4 were amended to explicitly state that lawyers should promptly
return or acknowledge client telephone calls.159 In recognition that
a lawyer’s mode of communication with the client is one of
constant change, the Ethics 20/20 Commission amended the text
to remove the specific reference to telephone calls. Rather, the
amended text now reads, “A lawyer should promptly respond to or
acknowledge client communications.”160
Just like in 2002, the most significant changes were to Rule
1.6. This time, however, the Ethics 20/20 Commission
recommended, and the House of Delegates adopted, a change to
the black letter law.161 Specifically, the amendment added a new
subsection (c), which provides as follows: “A lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to
the representation of a client.”162
Although the Ethics 2000 Commission provided guidance on
protecting confidentiality during the transmission of client
information, that guidance did not include factors relating to the
storage of the information.163 The Ethics 20/20 Commission
significantly changed the guidance the Comments provide for
lawyers in discharging this affirmative duty to protect confidential
client information.164 The amendments to the Comments recognize
158 Another trap for the unwary lawyer relates to the speed with which the lawyer
responds to client emails. Because email is instantaneous, the lawyer must be
responsive to email and manage client expectations regarding the speed with which the
lawyer will respond. See Hricik, supra note 9, at 469.
159 Reporter’s Explanation of Changes: Model Rule 1.4, supra note 137.
160 ETHICS 20/20 REPORT, supra note 153, at 4.
161 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 8 (“[W]e concluded that
technological change has so enhanced the importance of this duty [to take reasonable
measures to protect client confidences from inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure or
unauthorized access] that it should be identified in the black letter of Rule 1.6 and
described in more detail through additional Comment language.”).
162 ETHICS 20/20 REPORT, supra note 153, at 4.
163 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
164 ETHICS 20/20 REPORT, supra note 153, at 5.
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that unauthorized access or disclosure can occur even despite the
lawyer’s reasonable efforts to protect the information.165 Although
the Comments do not prescribe strict rules for the lawyer to follow
in deciding whether a technology threatens the client’s
confidential information, it does provide a list of factors for the
lawyer to consider.166 Specifically, the Comments provide as
follows:
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of
the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if
additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing
additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the
safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely
affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making
a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to
use).167

These factors, of course, sound similar to the concerns raised
in ethics committee decisions from across the country.
Even from its initial issues paper soliciting comments with
respect to its work, the Ethics 20/20 Commission recognized the
limitation of using amendments to the Model Rules as a vehicle
for helping lawyers determine whether a particular use of
technology comports with the lawyer’s ethical requirements.168
That limitation results from the rapid pace at which technology
changes.169 For that reason, the Commission asked the ABA
165 Id.; see also INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 8 (“The Commission
recognizes that lawyers cannot guarantee electronic security any more than lawyers
can guarantee the physical security of documents stored in a file cabinet or offsite
storage facility. Our proposal would not impose upon lawyers a duty to achieve the
unattainable.”).
166 ETHICS 20/20 REPORT, supra note 153, at 5.
167 Id.
168 Client Confidentiality Issues Paper, supra note 2.
169 ETHICS 20/20 REPORT, supra note 153, at 1. In a 1992 ethics opinion, the Ethics
Committee of the Colorado Bar Association recognized the “ever-increasing varieties” of
technology that had developed even at that point and the likelihood that technology
would continue to change. The committee recognized that changes in technology would
impact both the methods through which lawyers could communicate with their clients
as well as the ways that third parties might intercept those communications. Colo. Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 90 (1992), available at http://www.cobar.org/
repository/Ethics/FormalEthicsOpion/FormalEthicsOpinion_90_2011.pdf.
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Center for Professional Responsibility to design and maintain a
web-site devoted to providing practitioners with current
information relating to technology and ethical issues.170 The website would provide the technology-specific guidance that an
amendment to the Model Rules could not.
The effect of these rules, of course, depends on whether they
are adopted by state courts and bar associations.171 On January
15, 2013, Delaware became the first state to adopt changes
proposed by the Ethics 20/20 Commission.172

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW STUDENTS AND NEW LAWYERS
As the Model Rules now explicitly state, weighing the risks
and benefits of technology is an ethical responsibility of all
lawyers. All lawyers must think harder about how they use
technology for client communications and must also monitor their
clients’ use of technology to make sure that it does not jeopardize
communication confidentiality. Traditional brick-and-mortar law
firm lawyers perhaps have to analyze whether incorporating more
technology into their practice would benefit their clients. More
technologically-inclined lawyers have to consider whether their
use of technology perhaps exposes their clients’ confidential
information to an unacceptable risk of interception173 or fails to
satisfy the lawyers’ duties to provide competent legal advice and
170 Id. (describing the proposed website as “a centralized user-friendly website with
continuously updated and detailed information about confidentiality-related ethics
issues arising from lawyers’ use of technology, including information about the latest
data security standards”).
171 29 LAW. MAN. PROF’L CONDUCT 282 (May 8, 2013).
172 29 LAW. MAN. PROF’L CONDUCT 71 (Jan. 30, 2013). The Delaware Supreme Court
did not adopt all the changes that the Ethics 20/20 Commission had recommended.
Specifically, the court declined to adopt changes relating to practice pending admission
to the bar. Id.
173 Regardless of the form of transmittal or storage of confidential client
information, some risk of interception is always present. See ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (exploring risks of interception in
accepted modes of communication such as U.S. and commercial mail and land-line
telephones). The Ethics 20/20 Commission recognized this reality in its Introduction
and Overview to Resolution 105A: “The Commission recognizes that lawyers cannot
guarantee electronic security any more than lawyers can guarantee the physical
security of documents stored in a filed cabinet or offsite storage facility. Our proposal
would not impose upon lawyers a duty to achieve the unattainable.” INTRODUCTION &
OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 8.
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to communicate effectively. This evaluation of the benefits and
risks of technology is perhaps most challenging for the current
generation of law students and new lawyers, who are primarily
part of the technologically-inclined Millennial Generation.174
Therefore, this Article proposes that law professors, legal writing
professors in particular, and lawyers who supervise new lawyers
challenge law students and new lawyers to think critically about
when and how they use technology to communicate confidential
client information so that they are adequately prepared to
represent their clients.

A. Instruction about Use of Electronic Communications in Law
Practice Is an Important Component of a Legal Writing
Curriculum and New Lawyer Mentoring
Though use of electronic communication became widespread
among practitioners by the mid-1990s, drafting electronic
communications was not a common component of the curriculum
of legal writing classes even after the beginning of the 21st
Century. For example, in 2006, the ABA Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar published the second edition
of the Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs (the
“Sourcebook”).175 Part II of the Sourcebook describes the types of
documents that legal writing professors commonly taught at that
time: the objective office memorandum, pretrial and trial briefs,
and client letters.176 The Sourcebook does not include or reference

174 The “Millennial Generation” refers to those born after 1980. See PEW RESEARCH
CTR., MILLENTIALS: A PORTRAIT OF GENERATION NEXT 25 (2010), available at
http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-connected-open-tochange.pdf. Members of the Millennial Generation are also referred to as “digital
natives,” which refers to their distinction as the first generation to grow up with
technology. See Ellie Margolis & Kristen E. Murray, Say Goodbye to the Books:
Information Literacy as the New Legal Research Paradigm, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 117,
120-21 (2012).The prevalence of technology has created a generation of young adults
who predominantly use technology to obtain new information as well as to share
information. Id. at 126.
175 ERIC B. EASTON ET AL., ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRITING PROGRAMS 21 (Eric B. Easton et al. eds., 2d. ed.
2006) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
176 Id.
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electronic communication in its list of commonly taught
documents.177
Because the increased use of technology had significantly
changed the way in which even lawyers in brick-and-mortar law
firms were advising their clients, scholars began advocating
changes to the ways that law students are taught to communicate
with their clients.178 For example, Professor Kristen RobbinsTiscione’s 2006 survey of graduates of the Georgetown University
Law Center determined that practitioners are more likely to use
email to advise their clients than the traditional office memoranda
that most legal writing professors teach.179 According to Professor
Robbins-Tiscione’s research, few practitioners write traditional
office memoranda and instead advise their clients about the
results of their research by “e-mail, telephone, face-to-face
discussion, informal memorandum, or a letter, and in that order of
preference.”180 She found that email was the “graduates’ method of
choice for communicating with clients.”181 For that reason,
Professor Robbins-Tiscione recommended that legal writing
professors acknowledge the growing importance of electronic
communication and incorporate it into the legal writing
curriculum.182
That the current generation of law students and new lawyers
are part of the technologically savvy Millennial Generation does
not lessen the need for instruction regarding electronic
communication.183 For example, in a recent article, Professor
Kendra Huard Fershee encourages law professors to include email
See id.
See generally Maria Perez Crist, Technology in the LRW Curriculum – High
Tech, Low Tech, or No Tech, 5 LEGAL WRITING 93, 101-02 (1999) (“E-mail should be a
part of every LRW curriculum.”); Anne Enquist & Laurel Oates, You’ve Sent Mail: Ten
Tips to Take with You to Practice, 15 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 127
(2007) (providing tips legal writing professors can provide students in last class
regarding email communications when curriculum does not include email); Kristen
Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, From Snail Mail to E-mail: The Traditional Legal
Memorandum in the Twenty-First Century, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32 (2008) (discussing
increased use of email by practitioners).
179 Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 178, at 32.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 33, 41-43.
182 Id. at 34, 49.
183 Kendra Huard Fershee, The New Legal Writing: the Importance of Teaching Law
Students How to Use e-mail Professionally, 71 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 1, 10-14 (2012).
177
178
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communication in their curriculum because although current law
students are quite familiar with email,184 they most often do not
have experience with professional email.185 Because most of that
experience with email has been in social settings, which is
necessarily less formal than professional email, law professors
cannot assume from students’ familiarity with email that they
know how to use it professionally.186 Specifically, the
“rudimentary language usage” and lack of emphasis on proper
punctuation, spelling, and grammar in social email are
inappropriate for professional email.187
Similarly, Professors Aliza Kaplan and Kathleen Darvil
emphasize that the current generation of law students’ familiarity
with technology and differences in learning style from prior
generations necessitate a different approach to research
instruction.188 Much like Professor Fershee, Professors Kaplan

184 See Ian Gallacher, “Who Are Those Guys?”: The Results of a Survey Studying the
Information Literacy of Incoming Law Students, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 151, 173-75 (2007).
Gallacher’s survey of the writing habits of incoming law students from seven schools in
2006 documented the frequency with which that group communicated via email or
other forms of electronic communication. Id. Based on the survey results, Professor
Gallacher concluded that “electronic communication is thriving among incoming law
students.” Id. at 173. According to the survey results, email, text messaging, and
instant messaging were very common methods for electronic communication for the
students. Id. at 173-74.
185 Fershee, supra note 183, at 14. Professor Fershee points out that email began its
rise to widespread use when many of today’s law students were in elementary school.
Id. at 11. For that reason, today’s law students had considerable more exposure to
email than prior generations. See id.
186 Id. at 12-14. Other scholars have made a similar argument that current
students’ frequent use of social media necessitates instruction (either through
guidelines or classroom instruction) regarding the risks and benefits of its use. See, e.g.,
Anna P. Hemingway, Keeping it Real: Using Facebook Posts to Teach Professional
Responsibility and Professionalism, 43 N.M. L REV. 43, 53-57 (2013); Kathleen Elliott
Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just “Face” It,
41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 376-82 (2010).
187 Fershee, supra note 183, at 12.
188 Aliza B. Kaplan & Kathleen Darvil, Think [and Practice] Like a Lawyer: Legal
Research for the New Millennials, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 153, 154-56
(2011); see also Margolis & Murray, supra note 174, at 26. In 2011, Professors Margolis
and Murray conducted a survey of first year law students to determine their “research
training, experience, and general research practices.” Id. at 133. They concluded that
law students enter law school with “certain research competencies, confidences, and
practices.” Id. at 152. Because incoming law students are accustomed to conducting
online research in which almost any search produces some results, Professors Margolis
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and Darvil emphasize that the current generation of law students
is the first generation to have grown up using technology.189 That
familiarity with technology, however, perhaps explains why some
of the law students surveyed turned to non-legal Internet sources
like Google or Wikipedia and seldom used print resources for their
research.190 Thus, students’ familiarity with technology
necessitates perhaps a different approach to instruction about its
use, but does not vitiate the necessity of that instruction.191
Finally, Professor Helia Garrido Hull has argued that
common personality traits among members of the Millennial
Generation and their frequent use of social media and electronic
modes of communication necessitate additional professionalism
training.192 As one example of the increased need for this training,
she points to Millennials’ frequent use of instantaneous, public
forms of electronic communication and evidence that indicates
that they place a lower value on privacy than older generations.193
For that reason, she argues that law schools should place more
emphasis on training students about their ethical requirements of
protecting client confidences during law school.194

and Murray propose that legal research classes focus on helping students sift through
and analyze the results of their searches, rather than finding the law. Id. at 152-56.
189 Kaplan, supra note 188, at 174-76. (“Millennials believe themselves to be
technologically savvy and efficient multitaskers. They grew up using computers and
relating to the world through technology.”).
190 Id. at 165-68.
191 Id. at 176 (“Due to the profound changes in technology and how Millennials
learn, it is up to us as educators to rethink and reimagine how to teach legal
research.”).
192 See generally Helia Garrido Hull, Legal Ethics for the Millennials: Avoiding the
Compromise of Integrity, 80 UMKC L. REV. 271, 276 (2011) (“This article considers the
need to provide additional training in ethics and professionalism, and argues that the
current generation of law students are not receiving sufficient training under the
current approach used in most law schools.”).
193 See id. at 277-78, 285. Professor Hull describes Millennials’ views on
confidentiality as follows: “Millennials value confidentiality and privacy less than other
age groups, in part, because information flow is virtually instantaneous and they
generally believe that knowledge is meant to be shared not owned. As a result,
Millennials are less likely to appreciate breaches of privacy than other age groups.” Id.
at 277-78. This willingness to share private information publicly is perhaps best
demonstrated in social media. The frequent “oversharing” of personal information on
social media by law students demonstrates their lower expectations for personal
privacy. See Vinson, supra note 186, at 376-82.
194 Id. at 285.
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The most recent survey of legal writing professors
demonstrates that legal writing professors have heeded the
recommendations to include email assignments in their
curriculum.195 Question 20 of the Association of Legal Writing
Directors/Legal Writing Institute’s annual survey of legal writing
professors asks “[w]hat writing assignments are assigned . . . in
the required LRW program?”196 For the first time in 2012, the
survey included “electronic (emails) memos” as a choice among
other traditional writing assignments such as office memoranda,
client letters, and appellate briefs.197 Of the 172 schools that
responded to this question, 81 indicated that they assigned
electronic memos.198
The increased focus on electronic communication has not
been limited to just law school legal writing classes. Rather, a
search of bar journal articles and practitioner materials
demonstrate an increased focus on electronic client
communications and concern among practicing lawyers regarding
email.199 These practitioner pieces discuss both the need for
195 In addition, many of the research and writing textbooks provide readings
regarding electronic communication. See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN ET AL, A LAWYER
WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 9-10 (Carolina Academic Press 2008);
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 193-96 (Aspen 2d ed.
2011); LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK:
ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND WRITING 255-59 (Aspen 5th ed. 2010); NANCY L. SCHULTZ &
LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR., LEGAL WRITING AND OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS 203-11 (Aspen 5th
ed. 2010). Although some of these textbooks refer to the confidentiality concerns for
electronic communication, their primary focus is on the professional appearance and
content of the communication.
196 ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE
ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 13 (2012) [hereinafter ALWD survey], available at
http://lwionline.org/uploads/FileUpload/2012Survey.pdf.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., Jim Calloway, Email Issues for Lawyers Today, 83 OKLA. B.J. 1760
(2012); Gerald Lebovits, E-mail Netiquette for Lawyers, N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 2009, at 64;
Donald R. Lundberg, Ready, Aim, Disclose: Understanding the Power of the Email
‘Send’ Button in Your Law Practice, RES GESTAE, Mar. 2012, at 30; Janice MacAvoy et
al., Think Twice Before You Hit the Send Button! Practical Considerations in the Use of
Email, THE PRACTICAL LAWYER, Dec. 2008, at 45, available at www.alicle.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.periodical&pub=PL; Marian C. Rice, Email
Communications with Clients, LAW PRAC., Jan. 2013, at 14; Catherine Sanders Reach,
Enjoy Email Responsibly, ARK. LAW., Summer 2009, at 30; Wayne Schiess, E-mail Like
a Lawyer, 12 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 151 (2008); see also Peter Roberts, Protecting
Client Data: 11 Steps to Take When Using Technology, LAW PRAC., Mar. 2010, at 48
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electronic client communications to be professional in appearance
and content and the confidentiality concerns surrounding
electronic communications.
Thus, there exists a recognized need for instruction regarding
electronic communications.

B. Legal Research and Writing Courses and New Lawyer
Mentoring are Natural Fits for Instruction About the Decision
to Use Electronic Communication
Much of the conversation about the need to educate law
students about electronic communication has involved instruction
regarding the structure of electronic communication as well as the
need for electronic communication to be professional in
appearance and content. Although correct grammar, editing,
formatting, and tone are among the necessary components of
instruction regarding professional email,200 to prepare law
students and new lawyers for the practice of law, that instruction
also needs to put electronic communications in their ethical
context.
Creative legal writing professors have designed legal writing
assignments that help prepare students to communicate the
results of their research or advice in electronic form.201 These
assignments require students to consider the appropriate content
and organization for a professional email.202 Because the needs of
a reader who is viewing an electronic communication on a
smartphone, tablet, or laptop computer differ from the needs of
the reader who is viewing a hard copy of the analysis, assignments
(providing “list of the present requirements of competency for protecting client
information when using technology”).
200 Fershee, supra note 183, at 15-18; see also Tracy Turner, E-Mail Etiquette in the
Business World, 18 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 18, 18-23 (2009).
Professor Turner’s “practical tips” on professional email relate primarily to the content
of the email, but she also discusses situations in which practitioners should not use
email: when the email includes “sensitive, confidential or confrontational information,”
when the client prefers another form of communication, or when the email involves an
urgent matter. Id. at 18-19.
201 See, e.g., Ellie Margolis, Incorporating Electronic Communication in the LRW
Communication, PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING, Winter 2011, at 121
(describing legal writing assignment that required students to communicate results of
research and analysis in email to senior partner).
202 Id.
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such as these are crucial to a well-rounded legal writing
curriculum.
This instruction, however, should be supplemented with
discussions regarding the ethical implications of electronic
communication.203 The ease and frequency with which the current
generation of law students and new lawyers communicate
electronically necessitates rather than vitiates the need for this
discussion.204 Law students and new lawyers should be taught
that the lawyer’s duties of confidentiality, competence, and
communication sometimes preclude or alter the decision to
communicate electronically. That the recent amendments to the
Model Rules and recent ethics opinions obligate lawyers to be
knowledgeable about the risks of technology and warn clients
when their clients use technology in a manner that jeopardizes
confidentiality demonstrates the necessity of this instruction.205
To prepare law students and new lawyers to appreciate the
significance of the decision to use technology, the instruction
should include specific reference to the relevant provisions of the
ethical rules and ethics opinions.
Specifically, instruction and mentoring should focus on the
ethical issues raised in the ethics committee opinions discussed
herein and other related concerns:206

203 As discussed infra, other scholars have proposed that legal writing instruction
include specific references to the ethical obligations that apply to the student’s work.
Professor Melissa Weresh has developed a textbook that provides the relevant ethical
rules and other readings for the assignments typically completed by students in a first
year legal writing course. Her textbook includes a chapter on email communication
includes some of the considerations that this Article proposes legal writing professors
and supervising lawyers raise. See MELISSA H. WERESH, LEGAL WRITING: ETHICAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 15-37 (LexisNexis 2d ed. 2009).
204 See supra notes 183-94 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 112-20 and 142-172 and accompanying text. In a recent article,
Professor Michael Green points out that California Ethics Opinion No. 2010-179, ABA
Ethics Opinions No. 11-459, and the recently adopted amendments to Rule 1.1 are part
of a trend of putting an additional burden on lawyers to be knowledgeable about the
risks associated with technology, even when it is the client’s use of technology that
jeopardizes the confidentiality. Green, supra note 121, at 356-57. Educating law
students and new lawyers about the risks of using an electronic mode of
communication for confidential client information will help them be better prepared to
discharge this duty when early in their practice.
206 State privacy laws may also impact the lawyer’s decision of whether and how to
use technology to communicate with the client. Comment 10 to Rule 1.6 provides that
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Using technology to communicate regarding extremely
sensitive matters;



Using technology to communicate with the client who
does not use technology effectively;



Using technology to communicate with a client who uses
a device or system that third parties can access; 207



Using technology carelessly, such as by not scrutinizing
the recipient list208 or not checking the document
carefully for metadata;



Using technology without understanding the service
provider’s policies regarding confidentiality and data
retention;



Using unsecure mobile devices209 or public Internet
connections when communicating with a client or
working on confidential client information;



Continuing to use technology to communicate with a
client even when the electronic communication is not
producing the information the lawyer needs in order to
provide competent representation;

these privacy rules are beyond the scope of the Model Rules, and they are also beyond
the scope of this Article.
207 A third party could potentially access stored email either because the third party
has a relationship with the client and knows the password, the third party is an
employer who owns the device or email account that the client is using to send or
receive email, or the third party gains access to the device used to access the email or
the password for the email account because of carelessness by the lawyer or client. See
Hricik, supra note 9, at 469-70 (“If reasonable precautions are not taken to protect
access to computers which can access the stored e-mail, then the information, even if
safely transmitted over the Internet to the lawyer’s mailbox, can be misused.”).
208 See MacAvoy, supra note 199, at 46-48 (describing embarrassing consequences of
misdirected or forwarded emails).
209 As of December 2012, 45% of Americans over the age of 18 own a smartphone,
61% own a laptop computer, and 31% own a tablet computer. Trend Data (Adults), Pew
Internet & American Life Project, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data(Adults)/Device-Ownership.aspx. An almost equally high percentage of teens, who are
future law students, own these devices. Trend Data (Teens), Pew Internet & American
Life Project, available at http://www.pewInternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data(Teens)/Teen-Gadget-Ownership.aspx. Specifically, 37% of teens own a smartphone,
80% own a laptop computer, and 23% own a tablet computer. Id.
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Recognizing client expectations for the lawyer’s
responsiveness for communications sent through an
instantaneous technology like email;210 and



Evaluating risks associated with new or developing
technologies or new risks of interception for established
technologies.211

Legal writing professors are specially situated to raise these
issues with their students. In fact, some legal scholars have
proposed for a number of years that one way to rectify the
perceived lack of civility in legal practice is by beginning to
educate students about professionalism and ethical requirements
in the first year legal writing course.212 First, because the legal
writing and research course is the foundational course for learning
See supra note 157.
The constant development of new technologies has at least two effects for
lawyers. First, new technologies offer new ways to communicate with the client.
Second, new technologies perhaps pose news risks of interception of established forms
of electronic communication.
212 Donna Chin et al., One Response to the Decline of Civility in the Legal Profession:
Teaching Professionalism in Legal Research and Writing, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 889, 89699 (1999); Melissa H. Weresh, Fostering a Respect for Our Students, Our Specialty, and
the Legal Profession: Introducing Ethics and Professionalism into the Legal Writing
Curriculum, 21 TOURO L. REV. 427, 427 (2005) (“I argue that we should promote this
rich doctrinal material as an essential component of our curricula. We should not only
introduce concepts of ethics and professionalism in class, but we should make these
concepts a pervasive theme of our curriculum and pedagogy.”). Chin gave the nature of
feedback that legal writing professors provide, the nature of the assignments that
students complete, and the interaction between legal writing professors and their
students as reasons why the legal writing course is well-suited for instruction on
professionalism. Chin, supra, at 896-99; see also Julie A. Oseid, It Happened to Me:
Sharing Personal Value Dilemmas to Teach Professionalism and Ethics, 12 LEGAL
WRITING 105, 110-18 (2006) (proposing that legal writing classes include “value
dilemmas” because of small size of class, teaching techniques, and practice experience
of professor). More recently, Professor Anna Hemingway proposed that law professors
use Facebook posts as a vehicle to teach professional responsibility and
professionalism. Hemingway, supra note 186, at 53. She offers the first year “legal
methods” or legal research and writing course as one possible place in the curriculum
to offer this instruction. Id. at 54. She cites the legal writing professor’s ability to tap
into the first year students’ eagerness to learn about the profession and the
“unequivocal message . . . that professionalism is core to the study of law” as weighing
in favor of not waiting until the second year professional responsibility course to
provide this instruction. Id. She asserts that the smaller class size, increased
faculty/student interaction, and nature of some of the work done in the course also
make this instruction a natural fit in the legal writing course. Id. at 54-55.
210
211
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to communicate with clients, colleagues, and the court,
introducing the relevant ethical rules contemporaneously allows
the students to put both the rules and the communication in
context and therefore have a richer learning experience.213 Second,
most first year law students arrive at law school excited to learn
more about their chosen profession; incorporating ethics and
professionalism into the first year legal writing class highlights its
importance.214 Finally, the nature of the feedback and the
individualized attention that legal writing professors give their
students makes the legal writing classroom an appropriate venue
for introducing instruction about ethics and professionalism.215
That the legal writing curriculum is already packed full and
that ethics is typically a required upper level course216 do not
provide ample reason to avoid teaching law students that a
lawyer’s professional obligations impact decisions regarding the
use of technology in client communications. The ABA’s efforts to
revise the Model Rules in the Ethics 2000 and Ethics 20/20
Commissions to reflect the changes to legal practice due to
advances in technology signal the significance technology will
have on the practice of today’s law students and new lawyers.217
Given the current generation of law students’ and new lawyers’
familiarity and comfort with technology for social uses and the
prevalence of technology in modern legal practice, failing to teach
213 See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 175, at 36-38; see also Weresh, supra note 212, at
436-39, 442-44. According to the SourceBook, ethical rules regarding competence,
diligence, communication, meritorious claims and contentions, and candor toward the
tribunal are especially relevant for legal writing courses because they relate directly to
the skills taught in the course. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 175, at 36-38; see generally
Kristen E. Murray, Legal Writing Missteps: Ethics and Professionalism in the FirstYear Legal Research and Writing Classroom, 20 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. &
WRITING 134 (2012) (describing exercise requiring first year legal writing students to
identify errors in legal writing from media sources that had profound consequences for
lawyers).
214 Weresh, supra note 212, at 439-41.
215 Chin, supra note 212, at 896-99.
216 Professor Weresh identifies an “already overburdened” curriculum and required
upper-level courses devoted to ethics and professionalism as common objections to
incorporating ethics and professionalism into the first year legal writing class
curriculum. Weresh, supra note 212, at 429-32; see also Hemingway, supra note 186, at
55-56. Although she does not dispute the legitimacy of these concerns, she argues that
the benefits to including the material outweigh them. Weresh, supra note 210, at 43032.
217 See supra notes 135-72 and accompanying text.
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that technology is not always the best choice and that a lawyer
needs to use technology differently when communicating with
clients could lead to ethical problems.
My proposal is not that legal writing professors assume the
burden of teaching all the nuances of ethics and professionalism to
their students. Most law schools award two credit hours for each
of the two semesters of the legal writing course,218 which is barely
enough time to teach the fundamentals of legal writing. Rather,
because legal writing professors are rightly incorporating
assignments that require students to prepare electronic
communications,219 that instruction is incomplete unless it
includes a discussion of the threshold questions of when and how
students should use that form of communication.220
Raising this threshold question does not necessarily require
creating additional assignments. As described above, many legal
writing professors already include an email assignment in their
curriculum.221 An assignment in which the student has to
communicate research results to the client provides an excellent
opportunity to instruct students about the ethical concerns with
electronic communication as well as content, tone, and
professionalism. Weaving ethical considerations into the
assignment can be as simple as adding facts involving an associate
lawyer who has been asked to convey the advice to the client but
218 ALWD survey, supra note 196, at 7. According to the 2012 survey, 90 and 103
schools award two credit hours for the fall and spring semesters, respectively. Id. The
trend seems to be toward awarding more credit hours: 72 and 66 schools award two
credit hours for the fall and spring semesters, respectively. Id.
219 Although the current trend is to include instruction about email in the legal
writing course, my proposal is intentionally broader than just email. As Professor
Hemingway points out in her article about the use of Facebook posts, a professor who
incorporates technology into the classroom must adapt to changes in technology.
Hemingway, supra note 186, at 73-76. She uses email as an example. Id. at 73-74.
Although email is the current technology of choice for legal writing assignments,
younger generations prefer different technologies, such as texting. My proposal is that
regardless of the technology that a professor chooses for an assignment, the professor
should also discuss with the students how to use that technology in a way that
comports with a lawyer’s ethical obligations.
220 This proposal is consistent with Professor Weresh’s approach to integrating
ethics and professionalism into the legal writing curriculum. See Weresh, supra note
212, at 461. She describes one aspect of that integration as follows: “As we introduce
new forms of writing, we should bring our students’ attention to the attendant ethical
and professional obligations associated with the production of that document.” Id.
221 See supra note 196.
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the lawyer is out of town for a family trip, a client who uses an
email address that seems to belong to an employer, or a
potentially unfavorable result for the client. The instructions to
the student regarding how to communicate the advice should be
left intentionally vague, except for making clear the need for some
written documentation of the advice in the file that the client also
receives. The student would then have to sift through the choices
– phone call with follow up letter, letter sent through the postal
service or a courier, email, and so forth. After the students have
completed the assignment, the professor can engage the class in a
discussion about the choices each student made regarding how to
communicate the advice and how the ethical requirements
impacted that decision.
While critical, this instruction during the first year of law
school is the starting point for ensuring that future lawyers are
prepared to use technology for client communications in a way
that is consistent with their ethical obligations. Rather, the
instruction needs to continue through the law students’ early
years as a practicing lawyer. More experienced lawyers charged
with the responsibility of mentoring new lawyers need to
recognize the Millennial’s probable preference for technology and
electronic communication and temper it with instruction
regarding the risks it can pose.

CONCLUSION
Technology has forever changed the way that lawyers
practice law. Although today’s law students and new lawyers are a
product of a technologically advanced society, the experience of
using that technology as a professional subject to ethical
requirements is new. To adequately prepare their students and
mentees to use technology as an ethical professional when their
communication involves a client or client information, legal
writing professors and supervising lawyers need to provide
instruction on both the content of electronic communication as
well as the manner in which it is used.
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